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INTRODUCTION

Appellant Safe Home Control, Inc. ("Safe Home" or "Appellant") has appealed a
decision by the Honorable Christine Johnson setting aside a confession of judgment in
Safe Home's favor, and awarding attorneys' fees to Appellee Jared Munday ("Munday"
or "Appellee"). In a succinct and well-reasoned order, Judge Johnson found the
Confession of Judgment failed to comply with Rule 58A(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure on two bases: a) the failure to have a proper verification and jurat; and b)
failure to set forth a "specific sum."' Judge Johnson also properly applied Utah's statute
allowing for recovery of fees based upon a writing or contract, since the contract at hand
would have allowed Safe Home to recover its fees in an action for confession of
judgment. As a result, this Court should affirm Judge Johnson's decision in its entirety.
Safe Home now contends that the 1933 decision in White v. Heber City refutes
Judge Johnson's reliance on the 1989 decision in Mickelson v. Craigco, Inc. as to what
constitutes a proper jurat and verification. Safe Home's argument, however, ignores the
Supreme Court's decision in Worthington & Kimball Const. Co. v. C&A Devel. Co. 777
P.2d 475 (Utah 1989). These subsequent cases establish that an alleged verification fails
when, as here, the affiant himself makes no oath or affirmation in writing. Indeed, the
alleged verification in Worthington is remarkably similar to the one Safe Home had
Munday sign. Since Worthington and Mickelson are controlling, this Court should find
that the verification fails. Because Mickelson and Worthington address the issue at hand,
'See R.984-88.

moreover, Safe Home's reliance on extra-jurisdictional cases is unavailing.
Safe Home has also ignored the dramatically changed landscape for confessions of
judgment initiated by D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 (1972) and Swarb v.
Lenox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), along with the United States Supreme Court's analysis of

how Due Process restricts the procedures for judgments by confession. The earlier
decisions that Safe Home cites must therefore be read against the backdrop of this
modem interpretation of Due Process and limited accordingly. Indeed, the entirety of the
Utah scheme for judgments by confession is invalid, under the analysis set forth in Isbell
v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal.3d 61, 75, 577 P.2d 188 (1978) (invalidating procedure
virtually identical to UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i)). The critical missing factor as identified in
Isbell is the lack of assurance that the constitutional rights to a jury trial are freely and

knowingly waived.
Safe Home also fails to refute Judge Johnson's finding that the jurat was
inadequate because it failed to include that Munday was signing voluntarily and that he
had presented identification to the notary. Safe Home's failure to address this dispositive
argument is also fatal to its appeal.
Safe Home's arguments as to the "sum certain" also ignore Judge Johnson's sound
reasoning on this point. The Confession of Judgment at hand sets out no process,
procedure, or calculation for additions to or deductions from the judgment amount. As
Judge Johnson noted, "[t]here is no information as to how the decision on those amounts

2

will be made. . . . Any amount that may have been paid on this debt as referenced in the
Judgment is not known.'? The discretion provided Safe Home in the Confession of
Judgment makes it entirely different from the process embedded in Rules 54 and 55,
UTAH

R. Crv. P., for judgments and default judgments in general, and Safe Home's

analogy to those rules must fail as a result.
Safe Home also argues that Munday waived his right to contest the specified sum.
Safe Home, however, never presented this argument to Judge Johnson, and therefore it is
Safe Home who has waived this argument.
Finally, Safe Home contends that Judge Johnson erred in awarding Munday his
attorneys' fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §788-5-826, by claiming that the process
for recording a judgment by confession is not a "civil action." In doing so, Safe Home
ignores clear Utah case law interpreting the statute at issue as implementing a simple
degree of fairness and equity. Safe Home would have recovered attorneys' fees if it was
successful; indeed, it argues repeatedly that the Confession of Judgment here could be so
augmented. If Safe Home could have recovered fees, so could Munday.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Generally, Munday does not take issue with Safe Home's statement of the issues
on appeal. [App. Brief, at 1-2.] Munday does, however, wish to supplement that
statement with two additional matters and one other issue for the Court to consider.
First, Safe Home argues that Munday had waived his arguments as to the
2

R.0986.
3

Confession of Judgment not being for a "sum certain." [Id. at 19-20.]

Safe Home,

however, did not argue this point below. Among other things, Safe Home does not cite
where in the record it preserved this argument.
Second, the standard of review of attorneys' fees is correctness because Safe
Home is challenging whether fees were allowable under the UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5826. See Federated Capital Corp. v. Haner, 2015 UT App 132,

Hooban v. Unicity Int'!, Inc., 2009 UT App 287,

,r 10,

,r,r 6-7, 220 P.3d

351 P.3d 816 (citing

485, aff'd, 2012 UT 40,

285 P.3d 766). However, Safe Home is not challenging in this appeal the amount of fees
Judge Johnson awarded to Munday.
Third, if this Court finds that Safe Home complied with the applicable Confession
of Judgment statute and rule (which Munday believes the Court will not find), then
Munday argues that the applicable statute and rule violates Utah and federal guarantees
of Due Process. See Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal.3d 61, 75, 577 P.2d 188 (1978)
(invalidating procedure virtually identical to UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i)). "Constitutional
challenges to statutes present questions of law, which [ this Court] review[ s] for
correctness." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,

,r 5,

86 P.3d 735.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. The Case.
On November 18, 2015, Munday and Safe Home signed a "2016 Regional
Manager Agreement," (the "Agreement") pursuant to which Munday agreed to provide
certain services to Safe Home. [R.0010-30.]

Pursuant to that Agreement, Safe Home
4

paid Munday a "Signing Bonus" of $160,000. [R.0013.] Also signed at that time was
paperwork ostensibly allowing Safe Home to obtain a Judgment by Confession against
Munday for the $160,000 Signing Bonus plus an unspecified amount for attorney's fees
and costs, plus interest at "the statutory post-judgment interest rate," less amounts paid by
Munday before entry of judgment.

[R.0001-03.] Munday thus had no way to know how

much any judgment would be at the time he signed the Agreement. Safe Home's right to
file the judgment was also contingent on Munday' s alleged breach of the Agreement,
such as failing to work for the specified term.
Munday's signature on the Judgment by Confession was notarized by Edward
Michael Prignano, the general counsel for Safe Home. [R.0002.] The jurat says that the
statement was "subscribed and sworn" before Mr. Prignano, but nothing says what those
words mean. [See id.] More importantly, Munday does not himself say he swore to

anything. [See id.]
II. The Proceedings Below
Munday stopped working for Safe Home, claiming Safe Home had breached the
Agreement. [See R.0031-32.] On April 18, 2016, Safe Home attempted to have the
Judgment by Confession entered. [See R.0001-03.] On April 27, 2016, Munday filed his
Motion to Set the Judgment Aside. [R.0004-09.] On July 29, 2016, the Court directed
that an evidentiary hearing be held in the matter. [R.0112.] Due to stipulated
continuances between the parties and accepted by the Court, the hearing took place on

5

June 15, 2017. [R.0272-274.]

The primary issues at that hearing focused on whether the

Confession of Judgment provision in the Agreement was unconscionable, and whether
enforcement of the Judgment by Confession would violate Due Process pursuant to D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 177, 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972). [See, e.g., R.0004-

09; R.0088-100.] The parties, however, briefed a large number ofissues.3
On October 20, 2017, the Honorable Christine Johnson granted Munday's Motion
to Set Aside the Judgment by Confession. [R.0984-0988.] In so doing, Judge Johnson
sidestepped the primary issues raised at the evidentiary hearing. Instead, Judge Johnson
ruled that Safe Home failed to observe the requirements set forth in UTAH R. Crv. P.
58A(i), which sets out the requires for a judgment by confession. [R.0984-988.] Judge
Johnson specifically found that Safe Home did not provide the "verified statement" by
Munday that Rule 58A(i) requires, and specifically rejected the notion that the jurat in
connection with the notarization of Munday's signature was sufficient. [R.0985.] Judge
3

Judge Johnson did not decide many of the issues, including the issue of

unconscionabilitythat was the subject of the evidentiary hearing and Munday's
constitutional challenge. In the event this Court accepts Safe Home's arguments in this
appeal, Munday respectfully submits that this case should be remanded to the District
Court to consider in the first instance the additional issues briefed but not decided. See,
e.g., Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24,

,r 29, 332 P.3d 900 (remanding "to

allow district court to address the [ constitutional] issue in the first instance").
6

Johnson also found that the use of a formula to determine the exact amount owed, along
with the lack of figures to be used in that formula, resulted in the judgment not stating the
"specific sum" that Rule 58A(i) requires. [R.0986.]
Munday then filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.

§788-5-826, based upon the Agreement between Munday and Safe Home granted Safe
Home the right to recover costs and attorneys' fees in any action on the judgment by
confession. [R.0989-997.] On November 29, 2017, Judge Johnson granted Munday's
motion in full. [R.1079-1085.] She specifically held that Munday was the "prevailing
party," that an action for a judgment by confession was a "civil action" to which § 788-5826 applied, that Munday's litigation strategy was appropriate, and that Munday's
evidentiary support for its motion was sufficient.4 [Id.] Safe Home filed its Notice of
Appeal on February 23, 2018. [R.1196-1198.J
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Judge Johnson's orders below were correct.
1)
4

There was not a valid statement verified by Munday along with the

This is far from the first judgment by confession proceeding that Safe Home has lost on

nearly identical paperwork. See e.g. SafeHome v. Grenny, Case No. 170400797, Safe
Home v. Lee, Case No. 170400702, SafeHome v. Elgin, Case No. 170400746, SafeHome
v. Clyde, Case No. 170400314, SafeHome v. Van Oakes, Case No. 170400176, Safe
Home v. Sprinkle, Case No. 140401152.

[See R.0502-0504.]

7

Confession of Judgment. A basic requirement of a judgment by confession is that it be
accompanied by a "statement[] verified by the defendant[.]" UTAH R. Crv. PROC. 58A(i).
Utah law is clear that in order for there to be a valid verification, the affiant must himself
or herself affirm the contents of the document under written oath. See Mickelson v.

Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1989); Worthington &Kimball Const. Co. v.
C&A Devel. Co., 777 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989). Here, the notary, and not Munday,
signed after "Subscribed and Sworn" making this case distinctly similar to Worthington.
Because of this, White v. Heber City, 82 Utah 547 (Utah 1933), Safe Home's primary
case, is inapposite.
2)

The jurat did not contain necessary statements, including statements that

Munday signed the papers voluntarily, or that Munday provided proof of his identity to
the notary. Safe Home does not argue this issue on appeal, and the judgment should be
affirmed on this ground alone.
3)

The Confession of Judgment did not contain the necessary "specified sum"

that UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i)(l) requires. By its express terms, and as Judge Johnson
found, the Confession of Judgment had discretionary language allowing for increases and
deductions of unspecified amounts. There was no method delineated in the Confession of
Judgment for calculating what payments or other deductions would be made.
4)

Safe Home's waiver argument as to the "specified sum" was not presented

to the district court. As a result, this waiver argument is itself waived.

8

5)

The entire scheme for confession of judgments is unconstitutional as

violative of Due Process. Because a confession of judgment waives the constitutional
right to a jury trial, the waiver must be knowing and voluntary. The California Supreme
Court ruled that a virtually identical statutory scheme was facially unconstitutional due to
the lack of anything to suggest that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived this
important right. Munday respectfully asks this Court to take this opportunity to strike
down UTAH R. Crv. PROC. 58A(i), assuming it finds that Safe Home has otherwise
complied with the statute.
6)

Judge Johnson appropriately awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to UTAH

CODE ANN. §78B-5-826,

and Safe Home's argument that a Confession of Judgment is not

a "civil action" cannot withstand scrutiny. Among other things, that statute's use of the
phrase "civil action" must be read in conjunction with Rule 58A and the UTAH R. Crv. P.

overall. This includes Rule 2, which states "[t]here shall be one form of action to be
known as 'civil action."' Safe Home also does not argue that if the statute applies, Judge
Johnson incorrectly used her discretion in awarding fees. Safe Home also does not argue
on appeal that the amount of fees awarded was incorrect.
ARGUMENT
I.

Judge Johnson'sOrder Regarding The Invalidity Of The Confession Of
JudgmentWas Correct.
The United States Supreme Court has called a judgment by confession "the loosest

way of binding a man's property that was ever devised in any civilized country." D.H

9

Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 177 (quoting Alderman v. Diament, 7 N.J.L. 197, 198 (1824)).
As a result, judgments by confession are disfavored. Huish v. Sulenta, 2002 WY 139, 54
P.3d 748, 752-53. Statutes and rules for a confession of judgment are also "viewed with
skepticism" and "strictly construed."

Underwood Farmers Elevator v. Leidholm, 460

N.W.2d 711, 713 (N.D. 1990) (interpreting Rule 68 of North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure); Huish, 54 P.3d at 752-53.

Poorly drafted procedures for judgment by

confession do not pass Constitutional muster. Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 75 (invaliding
procedure virtually identical to UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i)). A party seeking a judgment by
confession must also strictly comply with the statutory process. Utah Nat 'l Bank v.

Sears, 13 Utah 172, 177, 44 P. 832 (1896). Failure to do so renders the judgment void.
Id. Accord Lathrem v. Foreman, 168 Ohio St. 186, 151 N.E.2d 905 (Ohio 1958).
A. Judge Johnson Correctly Found That The Confession of Judgment
Lacks A Valid Verification.
A valid judgment by confession requires a statement verified by the defendant.
UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i). The Utah Supreme Court has held that for there to be a valid
verification, "(l) there must be a correct written oath or affirmation, and (2) it must be
signed by the affiant in the presence of a notary or other person authorized to take oaths,
and (3) the latter must affix a proper jurat." Mickelson, 767 P.2d at 564. A simple
notarization does not suffice. Determination of Rights to Use of Water, 2008 UT 25,
18, 182 P.3d 362.
As Judge Johnson noted, the Confession of Judgment at issue does not have a

10

,r

valid verification. In Worthington, 777 P.2d 475, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a

situation similar to that here. There, the affiant signed a notice of lien. He, however, "did
not sign a correct written oath in the presence of a notary." Id. at 477. As the Utah
Supreme Court noted, "[a]ffixed below the claimant's signature the following
certification appears:
STATE OF UTAH>
County of Salt Lake )
On this
!Jt/J day of Jamwr_r 1981. Personally
appeared before me Edwin N. Kmball [sic]. who duly
acknowledged lo me that he has executed this notice and
that he has read the contents
true of his own knowledge.

thereof, that the same is

I.I'/ A mold Allred
Notary Public
residing at t558(i II'. 3500 S.

My Commission

expires

18 Sept 85

,,5

Id. As the Supreme Court found:
The foregoing was not signed by the claimant, but was signed instead by the
notary public. It is a certification by a notary public that the claimant
acknowledged to him that he executed the notice of lien, that he had read
the contents, and that the same were true. However, in order to have a
valid verification it is the claimant, and not the notary, who must sign that
the contents are true.
Id.
5

This certification is an image from Worthington as displayed on Westlaw.
11

As in Worthington,Munday did not validly verify the Confession of Judgment.

The signature blocks on the Confession here are:

_32()..54;2~

/.:fl~»-Edward Michael Prignano
(({~}

\~~~My Ccrrrn,
'"'

NOTARY P[JBUC

t<OTAR'r' PUSI.JC • STAiE OF lliA.H
Exp.

04/09J20l 7

Ccmmrmon # 665063

[R.0002.]
In other words, Munday signed above a line stating, "Must sign in presence of
Notary." And then the notary, Safe Home's counsel, Mr. Prignano, asserts that the
information was subscribed and sworn to him. Munday did not sign any written oath or
affirmation. With a striking resemblance to the invalid verification in Worthington, this
Court should reach the same conclusion as the Supreme Court did there.
To avoid the clear facial failing of the Confession of Judgment, Safe Home
contends that Rule 58A(i)(2) has no requirement for a verification to be under "oath or
affirmation." [App. Br. at 12.] The Utah Supreme Court, however, has defined
specifically what is required for there to be a "valid verification," which includes "a
correct written oath or affirmation[.]" Mickelson, 767 P.2d at 564. Rule 58A(i)(2)'s use
of "verification" directly imports the Supreme Court's definition for "valid verification"
12

as defined in Mickelson and subsequently used in Worthington.6

Safe Home's argument that Mickelson hinged upon the mechanic's lien statute
requiring a verification to be under "the oath [ of the claimant]"7 ignores the holding of
Mickelson. The issue there was whether the verification "was invalid [because the
claimant] admittedly did not make an oral averment as to the truthfulness of [the lien's]
contents to the notary public before whom he appeared." Id. at 563. Even with statutory
language requiring an oath, the Supreme Court held "[t]here is no minimum requirement
that an oath be administered to the affiant or that the affiant must speak an oral oath or
affirmation or raise his or her hand." Id. at 564 ( overruling prior precedent to the
contrary). In other words, the Supreme Court dismissed the formalities of an oral oath,
but specifically reaffirmed precedent regarding "the form of verification[,]" in writing,
which is required for there to be compliance with the applicable statute requiring
"verification." Id. (citing First Security Mortgage Corp. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah
6

Los Angeles Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Noonan, 181 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 834, 839

(1960), cited by Safe Home (App. at 13-14), is inapplicable as the California Supreme
Court subsequently invalidated a procedure similar to Rule 58A. Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 75.
The other cases Safe Home cites - Coast to Coast Demolition & Crushing, Inc. v. Real
Equity Pursuit, LLC, 226 P.3d 605 (Nev. 2010) and Mullins v. Bellis, 90 N.Y.S. 2d 27
(City Ct. 1949) - directly conflict with Utah Supreme Court precedent.
7

App. Br. at 12.
13

1981); Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983)). Thus, Mickelson holds
that a proper verification requires a written oath, regardless of formalities as to oral oaths.
See Mickelson, 767 P.2d at 564-65 (J. Zimmerman, concurring) (discussing "technical
swearing requirements"); id. at 566 (J. Durham, concurring) ("I do not join the Court
wherein it fails and refuses to follow likewise good precedent which invalidates the
notice of a mechanic's lien which is not verified under oath.").
Subsequently, the Supreme Court has stated as much. In State v. Gutierrez-Perez,
2014 UT 11, 337 P.3d 205, the Supreme Court held that the Mickelson "requirements
were clearly set forth in order to establish a rule for a valid verification." Id. at ,r 11
( emphasis in original; citation omitted). And subsumed within those requirements is
"that 'there must be a correct written oath or affirmation."' Id. (citation omitted;
emphasis added).
Finally, Safe Home puts much emphasis on the 1933 decision in White v. Heber
City, 26 P.2d 333 (1933).

[App. Br. at 12-13.]

Safe Home's reliance is misplaced for

multiple reasons. First, Safe Home fails to discuss, let alone cite, subsequent decisions
from the Utah Supreme Court, including Worthington & Kimball Const. Co., 777 P.2d
475, which directly impact the issues here. Second, the Mickelson court, while not
directly overruling White, discussed White in the same breath as Spangler v. District
Court of Salt Lake County, 104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755 (1943) and Colman v.
Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 (Utah 1984), both of which Mickelson overruled. See 767
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P.2d at 564. At a minimum, Mickelson must be read to limit the extent of White.

Third, White's holding is inapplicable to the facts here. In White, the main issue
was what constituted a proper "verification" for the presentation of a claim to a city, so
that the city could decide whether to accept or reject the claim. The City claimed that the
verification standard should be the same as required for verification of pleadings, and that
the verification at hand did not meet this standard. The court in White rejected this
argument, saying that "such particularity was not required with respect to a claim
presented to a municipality, as opposed to a claim in court." 26 P.2d at 335. The Utah
Supreme Court noted the "principal purpose" of the statute was '"to afford the proper
officers an opportunity to look into the facts and circumstances connected with the
occurrence; to preserve the evidence of the existing conditions; to determine the liability
of the municipality; and, in case liability exists, to effect a settlement without resort to
litigation."' Id. (citing Connor v. Salt Lake City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P. 479, 481).
Considering the principal purpose, the Supreme Court held that "[i]t is not seriously
contended that the time, place, and circumstances of the injury and damage were not
sufficiently stated. Thus, 'the principal purpose' as stated in Connor requiring the
presentation of a claim was accomplished." Id.
Thus, White is limited to cases involving the presentation of claims to a
governmental agency. It has nothing to do with the verification required for papers filed
in Court - particularly when those papers serve as the only basis for a judgment.
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Moreover, even if White somehow applied, Safe Home fails to explain how the

verification here was sufficient to meet the principal purpose of Rule 58A(i). Indeed,
subsequent decisions, including Mickelson and Worthington, have specifically stated that
for there to be a proper verification, there must be a written oath signed by the person in
question. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Perez, 2014 UT 11,, 11.
B. Safe Home Fails To Address JudgeJohnson'sOtherFindings
Regarding An InadequateJurat.
Safe Home fails to appeal Judge Johnson's finding that the Confession of
Judgment failed to have a proper jurat. As Judge Johnson found, the Confession had "no
indication that the statement was voluntarily signed[]" and "there is no indication that the
signer of the document produced evidence of his identity." [R.0985.] Safe Home's
failure to provide any argument as to this point is fatal to its appeal. This court has
"made clear that an appellant must address all of the circumstances upon which the
court's decision [below] was based." State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 810 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (refusing to consider propriety of trial court's sentencing decision because
defendant challenged only two of four findings upon which the sentencing decision was
based).8

8

Safe Home's failure to address the jurat argument is even more curious considering that

Munday argued the very issue in his Rule 10 Motion to this Court. [ See App. Docket,
04/04/2018, at 12-13.]
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C. Judge Johnson Correctly Found That The Confession Of Judgment
Was Not For A "Specified Sum."

Rule 58A(i) requires that a confession of judgment "concisely state the claim and
that the specified sum is due or to become due[]" and that "[i]f the judgment is for the
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, the statement must state
concisely the claim and that the specified sum does not exceed the liability." UTAH R.
CIV. P. 58A(i)(l)-(2). In addressing the first prong, Judge Johnson applied a commonsense approach to the "specific sum" requirement. As she held:
The equation given here to figure out the amount owed does not amount to
a "specific sum. " It includes that certain amounts "may" be augmented.
There is no information as to how the decision on those amounts will be
made. The amount of attorneys 'fees and costs is unspecified. Any amount
that may have been paid on this debt as referenced in the Judgment is not
known. There was no final specified amount here for Munday to verify, had
the statement been properly verified. Rule 58A requires that the "specified
sum " be verified, and this judgment fails to meet that requirement.

[R.0986.]
Safe Home does not address Judge Johnson's analysis. Rather, Safe Home latches
onto one phrase: "final specified amount[.]" [App. Br. at 15.] In doing so, Safe Home
ignores that its Confession of Judgment contains discretion and lacks any method of
calculating the "specified sum."
Rather than address Judge Johnson's analysis, Safe Home focuses on general
judgments under Rule 54 and default judgments under Rule 55, along with the attorneys'
fees motions under Rule 73. [App. Br. at 15-18.] Safe Home's argument ignores the
distinctive nature of confessions of judgment, which the United States Supreme Court
17

called "the loosest way of binding a man's property that was ever devised in any civilized
country." D.H Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 177 (citation omitted). Because confessions
of judgment deprive a debtor of all due process, courts strictly scrutinize the entry of such
judgments. See, e.g., Huish, 54 P.3d at 752-53; Leidholm, 460 N.W.2d at 713; Isbell, 21
Cal.3d at 75; Utah Nat'/ Bank, 13 Utah at 177; Lathrem, 168 Ohio St. at 188.
On the other hand, with default judgments, a party has been served notice, had an
opportunity to defend, and has otherwise not appeared. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 55(a).
Moreover, Rule 55 requires an evidentiary hearing if, among other reasons, a claim is not
for a "sum certain." Id. at 55(b)(2). In addressing this provision, the Utah Supreme
Court has required that a plaintiff put forth "credible evidence" of the claimed amount,
even if the complaint sets forth a certain sum. See Cadlerock Joint Venture II, LP v.
Envelope Packaging of Utah, Inc., 2011 UT App 98,
Supreme Court precedent).

,r,r 11-13,

251 P.3d 837 (discussing

For example, in Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., the Utah

Supreme Court reversed a default judgment where the complaint set forth damages of
$16,000 for damage to real property, with $5,000 being the value of destroyed trees and
punitive damages of$10,000.

589 P.2d 767, 768-69 (Utah 1978).

Even with numbers set

forth in the complaint, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the entry of a default judgment
and sent the matter back to the trial court. Id. at 769.9

9

Rules 54 and 73 are inapposite. In both contexts, judgments have been entered after full

litigation. Furthermore, Rule 73 contemplates motion practice to determine the amount
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As noted above, the calculation set forth in the Confession of Judgment is not for a
"sum certain" or "specified sum." It allowed for augmentation by discretion. It did not

provide any method of calculation. And there was no statement as to payments applied.'?
Safe Home points to "Representative Confessions of Judgment entered in Utah" in
support of its argument that common-sense allegedly dictates confessions of judgment
may be augmented. [App. 19, Ex. E.] Safe Home's "representative" sample, however,
omits numerous directly relevant decisions. In the following cases, as provided to Judge
Johnson below [see R.0502-504],11 judges rejected Safe Home's confessions of judgment
on similar grounds as Judge Johnson did here: Safe Home v. Elgin, Case No. 170400746;
Safe Home v. Clyde, Case No. 170400314; Safe Home v. Van Oakes, Case No.

of attorneys' fees, including an opportunity to oppose. See generally UTAH R. CIV. P. 73.
10

In the District Court, Munday argued that $80,000 of the signing bonus was paid to buy

him out of a previous contract, thus benefiting Safe Home. Munday sought a credit for
that amount. [See, e.g., R.0289-290; R.0464; R.0471; R.0473; R.808.] Thus, there was a
dispute as to what payments had been made, if Munday was liable, further rendering the
Confession of Judgment lacking a "specified sum."
11

While Safe Home has cherry-picked confession of judgment cases from across the

State, Munday provided Judge Johnson with all of the cases in which Safe Home filed a
seemingly identical confession of judgment, at that point in time, including the decisions
reached by each district court judge. [See id.]
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170400176; and Safe Home v. Sprinkle, Case No. 140401152. [See R.0502-0504.] And
there are other similar cases, including: Swick v. Preble, Case No. 160400551 (4th Jud.
Dist., J. Taylor) [Munday App'x at I] and ARM Security, Inc. v. Gines, Case No.
160401127 (4th Jud. Dist., J. Low) [Munday App'x at 2].
As to those cases submitted by Safe Home, a review of the confessions of
judgment at issues show at least some are different from Safe Home's discretionary and
facially inadequate Confession at issue here. For example, in Cedar Springs
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Graham, Case No. 150700893, the signed Confession
provided a balance owing and set forth a method for computing a remaining balance,
including that Cedar Springs would file "an affidavit stating the delinquent balance owing
by Graham." [Munday App'x. at 3.] Likewise, in American Management Services, Inc.

v. Houston, Case No. 160500018, the Confession of Judgment had a specific itemization
for fees and interest, along with specific payments to be applied. [Munday App'x at 4.]
Those judgments are thus distinguishable from the one at hand, which contains no
provision for a declaration or determination of figures to be used in the formula. 12
Safe Home also argues that even if the augmentation portions of the Confession of

12

In each of the district court cases cited by Safe Home, not one defendant appeared with

counsel to contest the entry of judgment. Counsel has reviewed each docket for each
case, and there is no attorney designation for any of the debtors. As such, judgments
were entered without any challenge.
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Judgment are invalid, that the Confession of Judgment should still stand. [ App. Br. at
19.J Safe Home has not developed this argument sufficiently to be addressed on appeal.
An issue is inadequately briefed if "the argument merely contains bald citations to
authority [without] development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority." Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2,

,r 11,

391 P.3d 196 (alteration in

original) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted). While inadequate briefing is
not "an absolute bar to review of an argument on appeal," a party that "fails to adequately
brief an issue will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion[.]" Rose v. Office
of Prof! Conduct, 2017 UT 50,
omitted).

,r 64, 424 P.3d 134 (citations and internal quotation

marks

13

The argument fails in any event. Safe Home fails to explain how the augmentation
is separable from the Confession of Judgment overall. Moreover, Safe Home ignores that
Munday contended below that he deserved, at a minimum, a credit for $80,000.
Therefore, not only is the augmentation suspect, but so is the principal amount.14

13

Cited in Snyder v. Labor Comm 'n, 2017 UT App 187, ,r 13, 405 P.3d 084. Moreover,

Safe Home did not present this argument to the District Court either waiving right to
review on appeal. See infra p. 22 (citing State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106,

,r 13, 236

P.3d 155).
14

See supra Note 10 (providing citations to where Munday argued below he deserved an

$80,000 credit, at a minimum).
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Finally, Safe Home did not raise its "waiver" argument to the trial court.
Therefore, the issue is not properly on appeal. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, ,i 13 ("[I]n

order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such
a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). Again, even if the Court addresses the argument, it fails.
First, Safe Home cites no case where waiver was applied to a confession of judgment.
Second, Safe Home bears the burden of proof to prove waiver. See, e.g., IHC Health
Servs., Inc. v. D&K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ,i 16, 196 P.3d 588. Moreover, '"waiver is

an intensely fact dependent question."' Id. (citing IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K
Mgmt., Inc., 2003 UT 5, ,i 7, 73 P.3d 320) (alteration omitted). Safe Home is improperly

making this factually-sensitive inquiry in the first instance in the Court of Appeals, and
its argument on this point should be rejected accordingly.
D. Rule 58A(i) Is Unconstitutional.

As currently written, UTAH R. Crv. P 58A(i), which sets out the procedure for a
judgment by confession, violates the Due Process of the United States Constitution. In
particular, the Rule fails to require the plaintiff to place evidence before the Court of the
defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard as to the amount owed. Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal.3d 61, 577 P.2d 188
(1978).
As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court has called a judgment by
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confession "the loosest way of binding a man's property that was ever devised in any
civilized country." D.H. Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 177 (quoting Alderman, 7 N.J.L. at

198). As a result, judgments by confession are disfavored. Huish, 54 P.3d at 752-53.
Indeed, statutes and rules for a confession of judgment are "viewed with skepticism" and
"strictly construed." Leidholm, 460 N.W.2d at 713 (interpreting Rule 68 of North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure); Huish, 54 P.3d at 752-53.
The statutory process for anything that works a summary deprivation of property,
even if that deprivation is temporary, must satisfy Due Process by allowing for notice and
an opportunity to be heard. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (invalidating certain
processes for prejudgment writs ofreplevin); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay
View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (invalidating procedure for summarily garnishing wages before
judgment). There can be exceptions only for "extraordinary situations," Fuentes, 407 U.S.
at 90-91, or when there is a clear, knowing, and voluntary waiver of that right to process,
D.H Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 184. Conversely, the process for a judgment by
confession is invalid if the summary process fails to obtain evidence of one of these two
exceptions.
Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal.3d 61 (1978) is the lead case to evaluate a
confession of judgment statute for Due Process concerns. In that case, the California
Supreme court invalidated a statute substantially similar to the one here. Both the
California confession of judgment statute and Rule 58A(i) allow for a judgment to be
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entered based on a writing, signed by the defendant under oath. The judgment must be for
a specified sum, must state concisely the facts out of which it arose, and show that the sum
is justly due. Compare former CAL. Crv CODE § 1133 (quoted in Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 67
n.3) with UTAH R. Crv. P. 58A(i).
The California Supreme Court held that the debtor's "execution of the confession of
judgment ... fails to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights.

Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 70 (emphasis in original)). It also noted that the statute did not provide
for a case-by-case review to determine the validity of the waiver. Id. at 71. It also said
that the ability to seek post-judgment relief is an insufficient cure because it does not occur
at a "meaningful time." Id. at 71-72.15 As such, the California statute for judgments by
confession was unconstitutional.
Rule 58A(i) violates the Isbell prescription for Due Process. The Rule does not
require prejudgment notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment by confession
is entered. The only evidence required is a "verified statement" by defendant as to certain
facts, with nothing additional to show the confession is knowing and voluntary. Nothing
in the rule provides for a case by case determination of the waiver's validity. Rule 58A(i)
also says that the court clerk "must sign the judgment for the specified sum." As Isbell

15

The California Supreme Court's ruling was also strictly prospective in nature and did

not affect judgments entered before that time. Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 7 4-75. Munday
similarly seeks only prospective relief here.
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notes, the risk of an involuntary or knowing waiver is high, and the signed statement
(which need not be made with the assistance of counsel) is not in and of itself proof of a
valid waiver. Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 64, 70-71. As Isbell also notes, the right to a motion to

set aside the judgment is insufficient to cure the deficiency. Id. at 75. As such, Rule
58A(i) fails to pass constitutional muster, and the judgment at hand must be set aside.
Even if the statute or rule authorizing judgments by confession passes
Constitutional muster, no such judgment is valid unless the defendant voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly waived his or her Due Process rights to prejudgment notice
and a hearing. D.H Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 187; Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191
(1972). As a result, the Court must conduct a "case-by-case, fact-specific review" of the
facts leading to the judgment by confession whenever that judgment is challenged.
Leidholm, 460 N.W.2d at 714. The creditor also bears the burden of proof to establish

the validity of the waiver. Isbell, 21 Cal.3d at 75. This is because the waiver is of a
constitutional right. State v. McCormick, 385 N.W.2d 121, 124 (S.D. 1986). See also
State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46,

,r 15, 79 P.3d 937 (prosecution bears burden of proving

waiver of constitutional rights; voluntarily absence of presence from hearing may not be
presumed). In addition, the Courts must "indulge every reasonable presumption against
the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." Wagstaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 778
(Utah App. 1990) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). See also D.H
Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 186 (no presumed acquiescence of the loss of fundamental
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rights).16

II.

The Reciprocal Attorneys' Fees Statute Was Properly Applied by Judge
Johnson.
Pursuant to the Reciprocal Fee Statute, "a court may award costs and attorney fees

to a prevailing party in a civil action if two main conditions are met." Bilanzich v.
Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 114, 160 P.3d 1041. The first condition is that "the civil action
must be 'based upon any written contract,' and the second is that the contract "must
'allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees."' Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. §7827-56.5 (prior version of §788-5-826). A prerequisite to either of these conditions,
moreover, is that the party requesting fees prevail in a civil action based upon a written
agreement. See UTAH CODE ANN. §788-5-826 (providing that the court may award
attorney fees to a "party that prevails").
Safe Home argues that a proceeding for a confession of judgment does not
constitute a "civil action" as the Reciprocal Fee Statute uses that term. Common sense,
however, suggests the opposite. As Judge Johnson succinctly stated:
While [the Confessionof Judgment} rule of civil procedure allows litigants
to bypass the initial stages of a civil case and proceed straight to judgment,
16

There are no findings in the record ofMunday's knowing and voluntary waiver of his

constitutional rights as Judge Johnson did not need to reach the issue. Therefore, at a
minimum, the case should be remanded for consideration of Munday' s constitutional
challenge as well as for findings as to knowing and voluntary waiver.
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that does not change the fact that a confession of judgment, once entered, is
a civil judgment which is subject to collection pursuant to civil procedural
rules. Indeed, as noted by Munday, in Utah there is only "one form of
action to be known as a 'civil action. '" URCP 2. The rule which permitted
Safe Home's Confession of Judgment is included among the rules of
Furthermore, a confession of
procedure which govern civil actions.
judgment fits well within the boundaries of a 'civil judgment' as defined by
Black's Law Dictionary: "any judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to
determination, will result in a judgment or decree. The action is said to
terminate at judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY {J01h ed. 2014).

[R.1081.]
The Rules of Civil Procedure should be read as a whole. Aequitas Enterprises,
LLC v. Interstate Inv. Grp., LLC, 2011 UT 82, 117, 267 P.3d 923. UTAH R. CIV. P. 2

states: "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."' Likewise, Utah
R. Civ. P. 1 states that the Rules "shall be liberally construed and applied to achieve the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." From these bedrock
principles the remaining rules flow, including Rule 58A. Therefore, the use of "civil
action" in Rule 58A and, by extension UTAH CODE ANN. §788-5-826, must be ascribed
an expansive interpretation to include all proceedings before a civil court within the state.
Safe Home fails to cite any cases interpreting UTAH CODE ANN. §788-5-826.
Rather, Safe Home latches onto the phrase "civil action" and then cites cases in other
contexts. Neither case cited by Safe Home, however, reaches the result it seeks. For
example, Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT App 297, 243 P.3d 500, involved the
question of whether a notice of claim under the Governmental Immunity Act was enough
to satisfy bringing a "civil action." Id. at 1 14. The Court of Appeals answered
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negatively and held that "the Legislature consciously selected the term 'civil action' and
intended that it be used in accordance with its common and accepted meaning." Id. at

,r 15.

The "common and accepted meaning" of"civil action" is, at a minimum, that used

in UTAH R. Crv. P. 2. Moreover, "Black's Law Dictionary defines 'civil action' as '[a]n
action brought to enforce, redress, or protect a private or civil right; a noncriminal
litigation.'" Raymond James Fin. Serves., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 S.3d 186, 190 (Fla. 2013)
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (9th ed. 2009)). See also Sullivan v. Hudson, 490
U.S. 877, 894 (1989) (similar). This definition fits squarely with UTAH R. Crv. P. 2.
Safe Home's reliance on Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc.,
2007 UT 17, 156 P.3d 782, is equally unavailing. In the cited portion,

,r,r 46-47,

this

Court rejected BYU's attempts to "enforce[] claims [against shareholders of a dissolved
corporation] in summary collection proceedings." Id. at ,r 47. This Court stated that "a
civil action means a proceeding subject to the full spectrum of due process safeguards."
Id. In stating its concern over shareholders not receiving appropriate due process in the
type of proceeding at hand, this Court held that it did "not believe that the legislature
intended, or that our constitution would permit, an enforcement proceeding against a nonparty shareholder to take place in the setting of a post-judgment collection effort." Id.
Neither case addresses the actual scope of what constitutes a "civil action" and, more
precisely, whether a confession of judgment falls within that purview. As detailed above,
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it clearly does. See, e.g., UTAH R. CIV. P. 2.17
Furthermore, Safe Home fails to address the policy underlying UTAH CODE ANN.
§788-5-826.

The purpose of this statute is to eliminate "'unequal exposure to the risk of

contractual liability for attorney fees."' Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ,I
77, 201 P.3d 966 (quoting Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, ,I 19). The statute thus "affords to the
party not benefited by a contractual attorney fee provision the same access to attorney
fees that the provision explicitly affords to the other party." PC Crane Service, LLC v.
McQueen Masonry, Inc., 2012 UT App 61, ,I 23, 273 P.3d 396. While discretionary, the
Utah Supreme Court has explained that "to creat[ e] a level playing field," the "courts
should award fees liberally under [the statute] where pursuing or defending an action
results in an unequal exposure to the risk of contractual liability for attorney fees."
Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, at,I,I 18, 19. As Judge Johnson correctly found, Safe Home's
argument would reach an absurd result that is an affront to the policy underlying UTAH
CODE ANN. §788-5-826, which is to implement a level playing field.
Overall, Judge Johnson's conclusion is sound:

17

More particularly, a properly drafted and implemented process for confession by

judgment also provides the due process safeguards that troubled the Court in Tremco. As
shown below, Rule 58A(i) is not that properly drafted statute. The fact that the current
scheme does not satisfy Due Process, however, means that the judgment at hand should
be set aside regardless.
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While Utah s Rules of Civil Procedure permit litigants to seek a judgment
without filing a complaint, that does not change the fundamental nature of
what confessions of judgment are. They are civil actions governed by civil
procedural rules. Moreover, Safe Homes interpretation directs an absurd
result, where it is permitted to seek attorneys fees [oJ n its claim, while

denying the defendant those same fees should the defendantprevail. This
would thwart the policy behind the reciprocal attorneyfeesstatute, which is
intended to eliminate unequal exposure to the risk of contractual liability
for attorneyfees.
(Id. at 3-4 (citing PC Crane Service, LLC, 2012 UT App 61,

,r 23.)

Munday respectfully

submits that this Court should reach the same conclusion.
III.

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) Claim for Attorneys' Fees.
Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9), Munday is entitled to his attorneys' fees if

he prevails on this appeal. Judge Johnson awarded Munday his attorneys' fees below
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §788-5-826. "[W]hen a party who received attorney fees
below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal."
Holladay Towne Center, LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LC, 2008 UT App 420,

,r 22,

198 P.3d 990 (citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)). If this
Court affirms Judge Johnson's order, including the award of attorneys' fees, then
Munday respectfully requests that this Court remand this case to Judge Johnson solely for
a determination of Munday' s reasonable attorneys' fees incurred on defending this
appeal. See Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, 181 P.3d 791, 798 (granting attorneys'
fees on appeal, with remand to District Court to determine amount).
CONCLUSION
Safe Home wants to saddle Munday with a six-figure judgment based upon a
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flawed Confession of Judgment. Judge Johnson correctly found that the Confession of
Judgment at issue failed in several respects, including a lack of valid verification by
Munday. On appeal, Safe Home relies upon White v. Heber City from 1933. In doing so,

Safe Home ignores Supreme Court precedent from over a half-century later. Safe
Home's attempt to distinguish Mickelson, upon which Judge Johnson relied, fails based
upon the holding in Mickelson. While Safe Home focuses on "oath or affirmation," the
Mickelson Court specifically held that all that is needed is a valid written oath- signed by
the defendant himself - for there to be a valid verification. The Confession of Judgment
fails in that regard.
Even if there was a valid verification (which there was not), Safe Home fails to
address Judge Johnson's order in regards to the missing elements of the jurat. Failing to
address that issue on appeal dooms Safe Home's appeal.
In regards to the "specified sum" requirement, Safe Home completely disregards
Judge Johnson's sound, common-sense reading of the Confession of Judgment here as
impermissibly allowing for discretion, among other flaws. Safe Home opts to make a
technical argument about "specified sums" being augmented, pointing to Rules 54, 55,
and 73, UTAH R. Crv. P. But even those rules do not provide Safe Home with the support
it seeks. Under those rules, there is due process allowed by, at a minimum, an
evidentiary hearing. Here, Safe Home wants to strip Munday of all process, and allow
for unfettered augmentation of the stated sum in the Confession of Judgment. Indeed,
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even the principal amount stated in the Confession of Judgment, $160,000, is contested
because Munday argued below that, at a minimum, he should be afforded an $80,000
credit. Safe Home fails to address this issue.
Finally, Judge Johnson properly awarded fees and costs to Munday. Judge
Johnson rejected Safe Home's argument that a Confession of Judgment does not
constitute a "civil action," and Safe Home does not provide any persuasive basis on
appeal for this Court to find otherwise. Among other reasons, UTAH R. CIV. P. 2 states

that there is one form of action - a "civil action." Safe Home entirely fails to address, let
alone even cite, Rule 2. Moreover, Safe Home's argument ignores the primary purpose
behind UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-5-826 - to level the playing field. If Safe Home
prevailed, it most certainly would have sought fees. There is no sound reason to deprive
Munday of the same possibility.
In sum, this Court should: 1) deny Safe Home's Appeal; and 2) remand this case
to the District Court for a determination of fees incurred on appeal.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(ll) &
Mfg}
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ADDENDUM

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
---0000000---

SAFE HOME CONTROL, INC.,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.
JARED MUNDAY,
Defendant/Appellee.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PUBLIC
Appellate Case No. 20180155
District Case No. 160400579

BRIEF OF APPELLEE JARED MUNDAY -- ADDENDUM
Appeal from Order Granting Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Granting Attorneys'
Fees, Safe Home Control, Inc., Case No. 160400579, Honorable Christine Johnson,
Presiding
MITCHELL A. STEPHENS
JUSTIN L. JAMES
HATCH JAMES & DODGE, PC
10 West Broadway, Ste. 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
E-mail: mstephens@hjdlaw.com
E-mail: jjames@hjdlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintif]lAppellant Safe
Home Control, Inc.

DALLIS NORDSTROM ROHDE
CARMANLEHNHOF ISRAELSON, LLP
299 S. Main, Ste. 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
E-mail: dallis@clilaw.com
ROBERT B. CUMMINGS
THE SALT LAKELA WYERS
10 Exchange Place, Suite 622
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 590-7555
Facsimile: (801) 384-0825
E-mail: robe1i@thesaltlakelawyers.com
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Jared
Munday

EXHIBIT "1"

'

FILGO
JUN 2 0 ·2016

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Alan Swick,
Plaintiff

Ruling Denying Judgment by Confession

vs.

Date: June 20, 2016

Roger J. Preble,

Case Number:

i w04 0055/

Defendant
Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor
--------------------------------------------------------------------------~--------------------------------------This matter is before the Court because the Plaintiff has asked the Court to enter
judgment. The Plaintiff has filed a "Confession of Judgment", without further complaint or
pleading and has submitted the proposed judgment. There is nothing in the Court file to indicate
that any summons or other process has been provided to the Defendant. The "Confession of
Judgment" includes the statement that the Defendant "hereby authorizes and consents to the entry
of Judgment by Confession against him in the principal amount of $10,000 ''plus interest thereon
at the statutory post-judgment interest rate until paid ... less such amounts as the Judgment
Debtor shall have paid to Judgment Creditor between the date of execution of the Confession of
Judgment and the date the Judgment maybe filed with the Court." The stipulation also states that
"[i]t is further agreed that the Judgment Amount shall be determined by subtracting those
payments, if any, that Judgment Creditor receives from Judgment Debtor after the date of this
Confession of Judgment, and adding attorneys' fees, costs, and any applicable interest on said
amount." The statement includes a stipulation that "[jjudgment creditor hereby expressly
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stipulates and agrees that the sum that is specified as the Judgment Amount shall be deemed to
be "justly due" and shall be deemed to constitute "a specified sum" within the scope of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure."
The "Confession of Judgment" was signed on October 16, 2012 and filed with the Court
on April 13, 2016.
Rule 58A, URCP, authorizes the Court to enter judgment based upon confession of the
Defendant where authorized by statute. Judgment by confession is authorized by U.C.A. § 7885-205. A party seeking judgment by confession must file a statement, verified by the defendant,
which includes a concise statement of the specified sum due and authorizes judgment for the
specified sum.
In this case the stipulation recites the amount due at the time of the stipulation but leaves

it to the Plaintiff, or the Court, to calculate the balance due upon default. The judgment, based
upon default determined without any mechanism for recourse or review, would be entered, again,
without any mechanism for review or even objection. This Court is of the view that such a onesided arrangement without even the possibility of notice and opportunity to be heard on the
critical questions of default and the balance due violates the fundamental notion of due process.
Indeed, due process of law requires, at a minimum, "adequate notice to those with an interest in
the matter and an opportunity for them to be heard in a meaningful manner" and is "owed in
every instance" before a person may be deprived of property. Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco
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Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17,

,r 28, 156 P.3d 782.

The Court recognizes that the parties may

have made a contract, in this case signed a promissory note (which has not been provided to the
Court) to settle an apparently disputed sum. The Court has no intention of ignoring the contract.
However, in this case there is an additional duty for the Plaintiff and the Court to give credit for
payments made during' the nearly 4 year period between execution of the Confession of Judgment
and filing with the Court. A request for judgment, even for the designated sum but without any
credit for payments is an implicit assertion that no payments have been made but without any
proof or way to establish that critical fact.
In order to preserve due process and ensure that the authority of the Court is not
arbitrarily imposed, the Court will require that adequate notice be given of the Plaintiffs intent to
seek judgment without any credit for any payments. Moreover, since the "Confession of
Judgment" is not for a sum certain but, rather, for an amount to be calculated it is the conclusion
of this Court that commencement of this action must begin by obtaining jurisdiction upon the
Defendant through service of process as outlined in Rules 3 and 4, URCP, together with the
payment of an appropriate filing fee.
The immediate request for execution of the proposed judgment is denied.

EXHIBIT "2"

The Order of the Court
Dated: March 23, 2017
03:07: 15 PM

is stated

1···::·~~·;. ~~I.~~·;·;;>.

below:
/ . ,,,-'~1:;,.,. · \
Isl Thomal;f..9,y&&,) j

Districf.f_9Wf,J°[clgc/
--<.!1·i,._ t \~>·"

Christopher J. Cheney, #15572

OLSEN SKOUBYE & NIELSON, LLC
999 Murray Holladay Road, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (80 I) 365-1030
Facsimile: (801) 365- l 031
Email: chris@osnlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE FOURTH JUDIClAL DlSTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ARM SECURITY, INC.,
RULING & ORDER
Plaintiff,

(Dismissal of Plaintiff's Claims)

V.

ADDISON GINES,

Civil No. 160401127

Defendant.
Judge: Thomas Low

Having reviewed Addison Gines' motion to dismiss filed on January 27, 2017, and pursuant

March 23, 2017 03:07 PM
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to the oral arguments held on February 24, 2017, the Court makes the following RULINGS and
ORDER.

RULING
I. Rule 58A(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the defendant authorize the

entry of the judgment for a specified sum.
2. The confession of judgment in this case anticipated that Defendant would satisfy the
liability it was created to represent and, therefore, not be filed.
3. It is disputed in this case whether Defendant satisfied any portion of the liability
represented by the confession of judgment.
4. Under these circumstances, Defendant is entitled to be sued for breach of contract or

unjust enrichment, or some other cause of action so that he can defend against a judgment entering
for the full amount represented by the confession of judgment.
5. Allowing the confession of judgment to enter without affording Defendant the right to
defend himself as to the merits or amounts of the liability would violate his rights to due process.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS:
I. Addison's motion requesting the Court dismiss this action is GRANTED.

2. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
End ofDOCUMENT-cOURT

SEAL LOCATED AT TOP OF DOCUMENT

CERTIFICATE

OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the I oth day of March, 2017, a true and correct copy of the foregoing

RULING & ORDER (Dismissal of Plaintiff's Claims) was delivered to the party identified below
by electronic email delivery for approval as to form.
I hereby further certify that on this 23rd day of March, 2017, a true and correct copy of the foregoing

March 23, 2017 03:07 PM
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RlCHA RD W. JoNES - #3938
RJONES@UTAHA TTORNEYS.COM
TAYLOR R. JONES - # 14690
TJONES@UTAH

ATTORNEYS.COM

HELGESEN, HOUTZ & JONES
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
5732 SOUTH 1475 EAST, SUITE

200

SOUTH OGDEN, UT AH 84403
TELEPHONE: (801) 479-4777

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DA VIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CEDAR SPRINGS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC,

JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

LINDA KAY GRAHAM,

Judge:

Defendant.

Defendant Linda Kay Graham, pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-205
and Rule SSA of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby confesses judgment in favor of Cedar
Springs Homeowners Association, Inc in the amount of$ I ,209.92. This sum is the balance justly due
as of June 24, 2014, for homeowner association fees owed by Defendant to Cedar Springs
Homeowners Association, Inc. Defendant hereby authorizes the Court to enter judgment for Cedar
Springs Homeowners Association, Inc and against Defendant, Linda Kay Graham, in the amount of

be entered for Cedar Springs and against Graham for the remaining balance.
balance shall be computed as follows:
that are to applied

Lo the delinquent

$1,209.92,
balance.

The remaining

less those payments received from Graham

Tf a Judgment by Confession is submitted to

the Court by Cedar Springs, it shall be supported by an affidavit stating the delinquent
balance owing by Graham.
4.

Should Cedar Springs obtain a Judgment by Confession as provided herein, Cedar Springs
shall be entitled to augment the Judgment by the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred
by Cedar Springs in collecting the judgment by execution or otherwise, as shall be
established by affidavit.

5.

Pursuant to the Federal Service Member's Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §520, the defendant
states that defendant is not in the military service.
DATED this

_L ""' day of/l.tif
J.H:11-y, 2014.

HELGESEN, HOUTZ & JONES

Auorney for Cedar
ings
Homeowners Association, Inc
Individual Acknowledgment

STATE OF UTAH

NOTARY PUBLIC

)

Brett Barber
676085
My Commission Expires
April 08, 2018

SS.

COUNTY OF ___.W-c...=._·
__

)

• UIAl·I

--1.1!. day of

___

The foregoing Settlement Stipulation was executed before me this
, 20J 4, by Linda Kay Graham, whose identity was made known to me.

/¢,v,/

0

~·

~~~---

c)J~ll)' ~I ic
Se nlcrncru Stipulation-

Cedar SpringsfGr.ia111/
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American Management
Servicei
50 E. 100 S. Suite 100 A
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone.: (435)-688-8443
Facsimile: (435) -688-8423

Email:

meg~n@amssg.net

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
a Utah Corporation
Plantiff,
vs.

INC.

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT

CRYSTAL F. HOUSTON
:--529-23~2149

-----

- ........-::--.. __ .._,-;,_

Defendants

·CiV'il~NO:·::--.:-~~~-=::::,

~=-- -, ""!,,,..,,..... ..

J

Judge:

CRYSTAL F. HOUSTON hereby execut a '~nd consent
Judgment by Confession as follows:

The Defendant

.IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

I

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED

to

that:

1. Plaintiff is granted judgment

against Defendant, bi:i~·ed.·on
Defendants failure to pay the balance on the account with the
Plaintiff,
together with costs as set forth below.

-

2.

Itemization
of amounts awarded are as follows: Principal: $607.58
Collection Costs: $ 1091.29,
Interest Fees: $1246.47,
NSF Fees: $0.00,
Check Service Fee: $0.00, $0.00,
Damages: $0.00,
TOTAL: $2945.34

3.

The total Judgment amount of $2945.34
legal rate.

4.

The Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of Plaintiff's costs
and reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to Rule 73 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure,
expended in collecting said Judgment by execution
or otherwise as shall be
established by affidavit.

shall bear interest

at the

J

Judgment by confessiqn.
5 .. -The..,E'_laint_.1;Jf.will.,ag_f~,J1ot_!_o,.file.,.the
with the Court as· fong as The De f endarit; pays as follows:
. ,~

-~

The defendant will pay a minimum of $50.00, per month
by the 4/25/2011
and every 30 day(s) after until paid in full.
In the event that the debtor misses a payment or pays late,
the Plantiff may file the judgment by confession with the Court
and seek all remedies available by law, including but not
limited to, garnishment, supplemental proceedings, writ of
execution,attachm
t, augmentation of judgment for post-judgment
at
costs.
this
day of
2011.

before me

Residing at:

/
!

I

/

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE was filed with the Court of Appeals via personal filing. I further certify that
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent via U.S. Mail and email to:
Mitchell A. Stephens
Justin L. James
Hatch James & Dodge, PC
10 West Broadway, Ste. 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
E: mstephens@hjdlaw.com
E: jjames@hjdlaw.com

DATED this 315t day of October, 2018

THE SALT LAKE LA WYERS
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